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Current Regulatory Challenges in 




Credit is a crucial determinant of financial success for most US 
consumers, but not all consumers can access it. This financial exclusion 
is partially due to traditional credit-risk scoring and approval processes 
that cannot assess the creditworthiness of “credit invisible” or “thin file” 
consumers––that is, consumers who do not have enough traditional  
data depicting their financial payment history. Consequently, some 
consumer-reporting agencies and lenders turn to alternative data  
credit-scoring systems as a way to increase financial inclusion. The 
enormous complexity of these alternative consumer credit-scoring 
systems, however, raises significant accuracy and transparency  
issues—most of which stem from their secret, legally protected  
status—as well as heightened concerns over the use of discriminatory 
and biased scoring practices using nontraditional behavioral data. If 
these issues are not addressed, alternative data-driven credit-scoring 
systems can potentially amplify transparency and discrimination issues, 
preventing consumers from understanding the factors that impact their 
credit scores. At the same time, they can position underprivileged groups 
to face increased discrimination in terms of both accessing credit and 
receiving favorable interest rates. 
This Note proposes four regulatory solutions and suggests 
enhancements to the Model Fairness and Transparency in Credit 
Scoring Act developed by legal and technology scholars Hurley and 
Adebayo. The current regulatory framework can better address 
discrimination by requiring lenders to disclose how they define 
“creditworthiness” so that consumers can gain a better understanding of 
the standards to which they are being held. It can also push lenders to 
foster more appropriate credit standards. Moreover, federal legislation 
is needed to curtail or prohibit the use of nontraditional behavioral data, 
especially data derived from a consumer’s social networks, which can 
unfairly penalize consumers for their social or cultural associations. If 
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this type of legislation is not likely to pass at a federal level, then 
regulatory agencies should regulate these firms under the presumption 
that behavioral data is inherently discriminatory until proven 
otherwise. Finally, regulators should seek to incentivize firms using 
alternative credit scoring methodologies to seek no-action letters. 
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Imagine you are eighteen, on the cusp of many exciting life 
changes—going off to college, buying your first car so you can actually 
get there, applying for a summer job to pay for gas, and maybe even 
putting in an application for a nice first apartment. Now imagine 
another scenario—you are brand new to this country, eager to start 
chasing your version of the American dream. You have never held a job 
or owned anything in this country, nor have you paid any bills or opened 
any bank accounts. In both of these scenarios, you have big dreams that 
are nearly impossible to achieve unless you can access credit. 
Access to credit can be a key determinant of financial success 
for a majority of Americans and is typically determined by an 
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individual’s consumer credit rating.1 A consumer’s credit rating  
can impact her in many important ways, such as gaining access  
to employment opportunities, obtaining higher education, and 
purchasing assets, such as a home and a car—assets that are 
traditionally considered crucial to building individual financial 
wealth.2 In some instances, such as when families struggle 
financially, credit is necessary for survival and is used to pay for 
nondiscretionary, essential goods, such as food and housing.3 
Unfortunately, there are approximately forty-five million people, 
primarily from Black and Hispanic backgrounds, who are considered 
“unscorable” because credit-scoring firms are unable to provide an 
assessment of their credit risk using traditional scoring tools.4 
Credit risk, which is summarized in a credit score, is simply 
defined as the “potential that a borrower or counterparty will fail to 
perform on an obligation.”5 However, with recent advances in 
machine learning and the proliferation of credit firms that utilize new 
types of data (“alternative data”) and methodologies, the way credit 
risk, particularly consumer credit risk, is assessed will continue to 
change significantly.6 
This Note examines how consumer credit risk scoring works, 
how it is changing, and potential solutions to fill the gaps in the 
existing regulatory framework. Part I discusses the differences 
between using traditional and alternative data in credit risk scoring. 
Next, Part II introduces the existing regulatory scheme for credit 
reporting and identifies areas where it falls short in protecting 
consumers. Part III proposes potential solutions to improve the 
consumer credit scoring process to address the risk of discrimination 
posed by using alternative data and concludes that lenders using 
 
 1. See Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE 
J.L. & TECH. 148, 153–54 (2016). 
 2. See id. at 202. 
 3. Examining the Use of Alternative Data in Underwriting and Credit Scoring to Expand 
Access to Credit: Hearing Before the Task Force on Fin. Tech. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,  
116th Cong. 7–8 (2019) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Kristin N. Johnson, McGlinchey  
Stafford Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Faculty Research, Tulane University  
Law School), https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109867/witnesses/HHRG-116-BA00-
Wstate-JohnsonK-20190725.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7FY-S8YP]. 
 4. See Request for Information Regarding Use of Alternative Data and Modeling  
Techniques in the Credit Process, 82 Fed. Reg. 11183, 11184 (2017) [hereinafter Request for  
Information]; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 
OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2018, at 26 (2019). 
 5. Supervisory Policy and Guidance Topics, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV.  
SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/credit_risk.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
2LVY-Z5VE] (Dec. 22, 2020). 
 6. See generally Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1. 
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alternative credit scoring methodologies should be held to more 
stringent regulatory standards. Finally, Part IV provides a brief 
future outlook on the use of alternative data in consumer credit 
scoring. 
I. TRADITIONAL VERSUS ALTERNATIVE DATA IN CREDIT RISK SCORING 
Access to household debt is typically determined by the 
automated scoring criteria adopted by a specific lender.7 Lenders can 
evaluate the creditworthiness of a consumer based on scores derived 
from “traditional data,” “alternative data,” or a combination of both.8 
Traditional data, according to the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB), includes information relating to loans or credit 
limits, repayment of debt, inquiries into credit history, and other 
relevant information from publicly available records.9 
In contrast, alternative data consists of all data that falls 
outside of the scope of traditional data, though there is no bright-line 
rule to differentiate the two.10 The CFPB mentioned several forms of 
alternative data in its 2017 request for information, including 
periodic payments data for non-loan products such as phone 
payments; rent, insurance, and utility bill payments; checking 
account transaction-level data; data related to a consumer’s 
educational and occupational history; consumer behavioral data; and 
data derived from a consumer’s social media network.11 Alternative 
data can also capture the consumer’s history of using alternative 
credit products, such as “payday loans, cash advances, short-term 
 
 7. See Robert B. Avery, Paul S. Calem, Glenn B. Canner & Raphael W. Bostic, An  
Overview of Consumer Data and Credit Reporting, 89 FED. RSRV. BULL. 47, 48 (2003); Request for 
Information, supra note 4; FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT 
AND CREDIT 2019: Q3, at 3 (2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/house-
holdcredit/data/pdf/hhdc_2019q3.pdf?fbclid=IwAR2yyO5tgmW-5ZawcKGLKNpemcBrgxOZ7SQC 
wIy-l3pr5Na_MLEDLVBMdmc [https://perma.cc/H5TU-XP5B] (reporting that aggregate  
household debt totaled $13.95 trillion in the third quarter of 2019).   
 8. Request for Information, supra note 4, at 11184. 
 9. Id. (“[D]ata assembled and managed in the core credit files of the nationwide consumer 
reporting agencies, which includes tradeline information (including certain loan or credit limit 
information, debt repayment history, and account status), and credit inquiries, as well as  
information from public records relating to civil judgments, tax liens, and bankruptcies. It also 
refers to data customarily provided by consumers as part of applications for credit, such as income 
or length of time in residence.”). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 11185. 
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installment loans, rent-to-own and title loans.”12 Many forms of 
alternative data are also considered “Big Data,” which is a distinct 
concept.13 Big Data is defined as “high-volume, high velocity, and 
high-variety” information and extends all the way from data related 
to consumer payment history to digital footprint data from users of 
smartphones.14 
A. How Consumer Credit Scores Are Used 
In evaluating the creditworthiness of a consumer, lenders can 
use their own proprietary scoring models, refer to well-known  
third-party models such as FICO or VantageScore, or utilize some 
combination of both.15 The creditworthiness of a consumer is 
summarized in the credit score assigned to her, and it is used by 
lenders to evaluate the consumer’s likelihood of defaulting, making 
significantly delinquent payments, or triggering other negative 
financial shock.16 For over thirty years, the third-party models 
developed by FICO and VantageScore have been the primary ways of 
scoring consumers seeking credit.17 In addition to lenders, potential 
employers and landlords also frequently use credit scores as a way to 
evaluate potential employees or tenants.18   
Credit scores and the underlying data are compiled into credit 
reports (also referred to as “consumer reports”) by consumer reporting 
agencies (CRAs), such as TransUnion, Experian, and Equifax.19 The 
data in the credit reports created by CRAs informs the traditional 
consumer credit score (e.g., FICO or VantageScore) that is reported, 
and, if lenders choose to use their own proprietary models, they can 
evaluate consumers using the data captured in the report.20 For  
the purposes of reporting traditional consumer credit scores, the 
 
 12. The State of Alternative Credit Data, EXPERIAN 18 (2018), https://www.experian.com/ 
assets/consumer-information/white-papers/alternative-credit-data-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6EGA-MGHR]. 
 13. Request for Information, supra note 4, at 11184 n.4. 
 14. Ceylan Onay & Elif Öztürk, A Review of Credit Scoring Research in the Age of Big 
Data, 26 J. FIN. REGUL. & COMPLIANCE 382, 382–83 (2018). 
 15. Request for Information, supra note 4, at 11184. 
 16. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 153–54; Request for Information, supra note 4, at 
11184. 
 17. See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 154; Latoya Irby, VantageScore Credit Score 
Overview, THE BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/vantagescore-credit-score-overview-961140 
[https://perma.cc/5DL6-7HG9] (May 1, 2020). 
 18. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 154. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Request for Information, supra note 4, at 11184. 
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CRAs maintain and utilize traditional data that falls into four 
categories: header data (data that helps identify the consumer), 
public record data, tradeline data on each loan or line of credit the 
consumer has obtained, and inquiry data that depicts the number of 
inquiries made into the consumer’s credit files.21 
The credit score reported in a consumer’s credit report is not 
entirely a reflection of the individual consumer’s likelihood of default; 
rather, it reflects the historical rates of default within a group of 
borrowers who share the same credit score.22 In other words, 
borrowers are segmented into various score bands, and each score 
band has a corresponding predicted rate of default, where consumers 
in the higher score bands have lower historical rates of default and 
consumers in the lower score bands are viewed as high-risk borrowers 
due to higher historical rates of default.23 Lenders use these scores to 
determine which consumers they view as creditworthy; to this end, 
lenders establish a cutoff score below which they will not extend 
credit.24   
B. The Purpose of Using Alternative Data for Consumer Credit Scoring 
Given how important a credit report with a reportable score is 
to accessing consumer credit, consumers who either do not have any 
credit history on file with a CRA or have not yet generated a sufficient 
credit history for a traditional credit score have a very difficult  
time accessing consumer credit, and they may need to resort to  
high-interest substitutes that can further disadvantage them 
financially.25 As of 2015, the Bureau has estimated that twenty-six 
million Americans are “credit invisible” and have no file at the three 
major CRAs, while another nineteen million do not have sufficient 
data on file to develop a traditional credit score.26 This population of 
forty-five million unscorable consumers is primarily comprised of 
individuals from historically underprivileged communities, including 
consumers from Black, Hispanic, and low-income backgrounds.27 Of 
the adults who applied for credit in 2018, nearly one-third were 
 
 21. Peter Carroll & Saba Rehmani, Alternative Data and the Unbanked, OLIVER WYMAN 
14 (2017), https://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-wyman/v2/publications/2017/may/Al-
ternative_Data_And_The_%20Unbanked.pdf [https://perma.cc/GH5K-HYZ8]. 
 22. Id. at 4. 
 23. Id. at 5. 
 24. Id. at 4. 
 25. Request for Information, supra note 4, at 11184. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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denied credit or offered less than what they applied for.28 Of that 
sample, 76 percent of those denied credit were Black and Hispanic.29   
Alternative data and its corresponding algorithms have been 
recognized by both lenders and regulators alike as potential tools  
to increase inclusion of consumers from historically disadvantaged 
communities into the financial system.30 Additionally, the use of 
alternative data may allow lenders to identify creditworthy 
consumers who would otherwise fall into score bands below the cutoff 
in traditional credit scoring systems; in other words, alternative data 
may be able to improve the granularity of the score bands used to 
compute credit scores.31 This added granularity could help borrowers 
in lower score bands access credit at lower interest rates, as there 
would be a way to differentiate between borrowers who are near the 
cutoff but still creditworthy.32 Finally, in addition to increasing 
financial inclusion and enhancing estimates of creditworthiness, 
alternative data also has the potential to improve the timeliness, or 
temporal relevance, of assessments and decrease transaction costs for 
lenders by improving the accuracy of decision-making.33 
The characteristics of good alternative data include timeliness 
and accuracy, relevance to the intended behavioral prediction, 
regulatory compliance, “broad and consistent coverage” across 
consumers, “consumer-specific” elements (rather than elements 
based on consumer segments), and “orthogonality”––the notion that 
the alternative data can work in conjunction with traditional data to 
improve the “predictive accuracy” of the credit score.34 Logically, 
these characteristics are relevant to any data used in predictive 
modeling: the data should be related to the purpose of the model, 
comply with existing regulations, and be as individualized as 
possible, given that the model’s ultimate prediction will be 
individualized. Moreover, alternative data should be thought of as a 
way to enhance or improve existing data.35 
 
 28. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 4, at 26. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Consumer Fin. Prot.  
Bureau, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Nat’l Credit Union Admin. & Off. of the Comptroller of the  
Currency, Interagency Statement on the Use of Alternative Data in Credit Underwriting (Dec.  
3, 2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20191203b1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/46NW-KSNB]. 
 31. Carroll & Rehmani, supra note 21, at 2. 
 32. Id. at 10. 
 33. Request for Information, supra note 4, at 11186. 
 34. Carroll & Rehmani, supra note 21, at 9. 
 35. See id. at 8–9. 
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January 2019 research from the Federal Reserve Bank showed 
optimistic results for using alternative data in consumer lending 
scoring models.36 Specifically, LendingClub consumer ratings were 
more strongly correlated with loan performance and interest  
rates than ratings created by traditional lenders (i.e., banks).37 
Additionally, financial inclusion was increased, and borrowers who 
would have otherwise been in a subprime score band were able to gain 
access to credit.38 While this may be very promising news, there are 
several regulatory issues that must be addressed before similar 
results can be seen across the credit-scoring industry. 
C. Current Issues with Using Alternative Data in Consumer Credit 
Risk Scoring 
One of the primary issues stemming from the use of alternative 
data is the ability to use nontraditional data—especially behavioral 
data unrelated to a consumer’s financial status or history.39 Internet 
browsing-related data (e.g., search history) and social network  
data—including an analysis of where the consumer is perceived to  
fall within the hierarchy of her social network—fall within this 
category of alternative data.40 One fintech firm, ZestFinance, collects 
behavioral data from its own website, including how quickly a 
consumer scrolls through the firm’s consumer disclosures to represent 
how carefully the consumer arrives at a decision.41 Other examples 
include club memberships, online shopping behavior, and online 
profile data.42 In addition to the potential regulatory violations 
(discussed in Part II), this type of data, on its face, is not intuitively 
relevant to the intended behavioral prediction: the consumer’s 
propensity to default or make delinquent payments.43 Indeed, experts 
 
 36. See Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, The Roles of Alternative Data and Machine 
Learning in Fintech Lending: Evidence from the LendingClub Consumer Platform 18 (Fed. Rsrv. 
Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 18-15, 2019), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/frbp/as-
sets/working-papers/2018/wp18-15r.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/FR8U-3PQC]. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 164–68. 
 40. See Hearing, supra note 3, at 5. 
 41. See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 164–65 (describing the scoring model used by 
ZestFinance, “one of the most prominent players in the alternative credit-scoring and underwriting 
industry”). 
 42. Id. at 165 (providing examples of other alternative data inputs used by firms in  
consumer credit scoring). 
 43. Id. at 164–65. 
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criticize the use of data elements that are not inherently tied to 
creditworthiness in the “all data is credit data” approach.44 
1. Data Quality and Accuracy Issues with Alternative Data 
The use of alternative data raises additional challenges—data 
quality and accuracy issues.45 CRAs run into accuracy issues even 
with traditional data, which uses a smaller set of data relative to most 
forms of alternative data.46 It makes sense that with alternative 
data—where there is a much higher volume of data generated—size 
itself becomes an issue when it comes to ensuring that the collected 
data is accurate.47 
In 2013, fifteen National Consumer Law Center employees 
conducted a survey to view the consumer data collected on each of 
them by four Big Data brokers: eBureau, ID Analytics, Intelius, and 
Spokeo.48 Errors were found in nearly two-thirds of the sixty reports 
generated.49 The survey participants had to take several steps to 
request the reports, verify their identifies, and sometimes pay to 
receive the individual consumer reports.50 There was a broad range of 
types of information errors; most errors were observed in data related 
to address and residence information, education, family members, 
social profiles, and income.51 
Even more recently, research has shown that some of the Big 
Data “continuously mined” from consumer activities “may incorporate 
a high degree of inaccurate information.”52 The CFPB, in its 2017 
request for information, indicated that the data accuracy issues in 
alternative data are greater than those observed in traditional data. 
This inaccuracy is attributable to either the nature of the data itself 
or lower standards for data quality and accuracy in uses of the 
alternative data outside of credit scoring.53 
 
 44. Id. at 158, 164. 
 45. Id. at 152. 
 46. Id. at 152–53. 
 47. Id. at 153. 
 48. Persis Yu, Jillian McLaughlin & Marina Levy, Big Data: A Big Disappointment  
for Scoring Consumer Creditworthiness, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. 15 (Mar. 3, 2014), 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-big-data.pdf [https://perma.cc/VN4Q-TSF6]. 
 49. Id. at 18. 
 50. Id. at 16–17. 
 51. Id. at 18. 
 52. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 153. 
 53. Request for Information, supra note 4, at 11187. 
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2. The Role of Algorithms in Consumer Credit Scoring 
Before addressing the issues stemming from the algorithms 
and tools used in conjunction with alternative data, it is important to 
understand the relationship between these algorithms and Big Data 
used to analyze or identify alternative data for credit scoring. An 
algorithm is a model that uses a computational process to analyze 
input data and generate output data.54 Firms can develop algorithms 
to identify relationships between various types of input data. These 
firms can identify relationships either through supervised machine 
learning, where a researcher assesses how different data elements 
impact the desired output (e.g., predicted default rate), or through 
unsupervised learning, where the algorithm identifies relationships 
between data inputs and identifies patterns in data regardless of how 
they relate to the specific desired output variable, if there is one.55 
The extremely complex credit-scoring algorithms are designed 
to analyze and identify relationships within a high volume and  
broad variety of Big Data, especially nontraditional data (e.g., 
behavioral data) generated from consumer social media and spending  
records.56 At times—and especially in the context of supervised  
algorithms—raw data must be transformed into data sets.57 Data 
transformation can involve complex steps that incorporate multiple 
layers of information, sometimes generating “metavariables” that 
summarize relationships between multiple data points.58 Data 
transformation is just one component that complicates the use of 
alternative credit scoring systems. Once the data is actually 
translated, it is analyzed through the many complex models that 
comprise the algorithm.59 The complexity of this process makes it 
highly unlikely that consumers could identify data quality issues in 
the input data feeding the models.60 This complexity demands 
investigation of the gaps and recent developments in the existing 
regulatory scheme, which must adapt in a timely manner to address 
the risks stemming from such a complex process. 
 
 54. See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 159 (defining algorithms as “any well-defined 
computational procedure that takes some value, or set of values, as input and produces some value, 
or set of values, as an output.”) (citation omitted). 
 55. Id. at 161–62. 
 56. Id. at 152, 163. 
 57. See id. at 174, 176. 
 58. Id. at 176. 
 59. Id. at 181. 
 60. Id. at 182. 
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II. THE EXISTING REGULATORY SCHEME AND ITS CURRENT SHORTFALLS 
A. The Fair Credit Reporting Act 
The purpose of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) is to 
ensure “[a]ccuracy and fairness of credit reporting” and require CRAs 
to “adopt reasonable procedures” to protect the “confidentiality, 
accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization” of sensitive consumer 
information “in a manner which is fair and equitable to the 
consumer.”61 The FCRA protects consumer privacy by limiting how 
consumer credit information can be communicated or used, and it 
gives consumers ways to access the data underlying their credit 
scores, along with an understanding of how third parties use 
consumer data in relation to credit, employment, and insurance 
decisions.62 
The FCRA primarily regulates CRAs, though it also places 
obligations on third-party users of consumer reports and third-party 
furnishers of data who provide CRAs with consumer information.63 
The statute defines a CRA as “any person which . . . regularly engages 
in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating 
consumer credit information or other information . . . for the purpose 
of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.”64 The last qualifier 
in this definition—the requirement that consumer credit information 
is furnished by CRAs to third parties—can help firms employing 
alternative credit data avoid governance by the FCRA.65 Firms that 
do not resell the data to third parties but still use the data for  
credit-scoring purposes are not currently within the scope of the 
FCRA because of the limitation in the statutory definition of CRA.66   
While the FCRA does not promulgate definitions for users and 
furnishers of consumer information, it does outline duties for entities 
who use and provide consumer reports.67 Users of consumer reports 
can only obtain the report if they have a statutorily permissible 
purpose, such as credit transactions pertaining to a consumer seeking 
credit, employment, or insurance underwriting.68 Furnishers of credit 
 
 61. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 602, 84 Stat. 1114, 1128 (1970)  
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–81x (2018)). 
 62. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 184. 
 63. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e, 1681m, 1681s-2. 
 64. Id. § 1681a(f). 
 65. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 187. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a, 1681m, 1681s-2. 
 68. Id. § 1681b(a)(3)(A)–(C). 
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reports have statutorily defined duties including providing accurate 
information to CRAs, and in cases where information is inaccurate, 
taking timely steps to provide notice to the CRA that the information 
is inaccurate or may be in dispute.69 
Users of consumer reports must also notify a consumer when 
they use a CRA-provided report as the basis for an adverse action 
against a consumer. An adverse action includes the denial of credit, 
insurance, or employment opportunities or an increase in rates 
charged for credit or insurance.70 The user of the consumer report is 
also required to provide the relevant numerical credit score used  
in the determination, all of the key factors (or the top four) that 
adversely affected the consumer’s credit score, the date the relevant 
credit score was created, and the name of the entity that provided the 
credit score.71 
Notably, there is no statutory requirement for a detailed 
explanation of factors that are included as part of adverse action 
notice.72 For example, users (and CRAs, when a consumer requests 
her credit score) do not have to explain how the factors are weighted 
or what the factors even mean; vague “phrases like ‘type of bank 
accounts’ and ‘type of credit references’” are acceptable, even though 
they do not help a consumer reliably understand how her individual 
actions impact her credit score.73 This type of phrasing will be even 
less useful for consumers when firms employ extremely complex 
alternative scoring methodologies to provide adverse action notices. 
Whether firms using alternative data generate reports that 
fall into the statutory definition of consumer reports indicates how 
these firms will be regulated.74 The definition of a consumer report is 
broad and includes any information from a CRA that influences the 
creditworthiness or reputation of a consumer.75 However, the 
definition is limited by the requirement that information must relate 
to “an identifiable person,” and not a subset of individuals in the 
aggregate, such as a household or all of the individuals who live in 
the same neighborhood.76 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has 
adopted the view that even if information is not linked to an 
 
 69. Id. § 1681s-2. 
 70. Id. § 1681a(k). 
 71. Id. §§ 1681m(a)(2), 1681g(f)(1)(B)–(E). 
 72. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for  
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 (2014). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Hearing, supra note 3, at 10–11. 
 75. See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 185. 
 76. Id. 
2021] DISCRIMINATION IN CONSUMER CREDIT SCORING 637 
identifiable person (e.g., by name), it qualifies as a consumer report 
“if it could be reasonably linked [back] to the consumer.”77 The FTC’s 
view is important given the expansion in the types of alternative Big 
Data that are used, some forms of which may be traceable back to 
individual consumers.78 
B. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) prohibits 
discrimination by a creditor against an applicant on the basis of 
certain protected characteristics during any aspect of a credit 
transaction.79 The following characteristics are protected against 
discrimination: race, color, religion, national origin, marital status, 
sex, age, public assistance status, and exercise of rights under the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act.80 While “credit transaction” is not 
explicitly defined in the ECOA, its enacting regulations define the 
term broadly and include all aspects of an applicant’s interaction with 
a creditor related to an application for new or existing credit.81 
Experts interpret the breadth of these definitions to mean that in 
addition to CRAs, fintech firms who provide consumer credit scores 
or credit assessment tools are within the scope of the ECOA, even if 
they do not make the ultimate lending decisions.82 
There are two ways for a plaintiff to allege discrimination 
under the ECOA: she can allege disparate treatment, disparate 
impact, or both.83 To allege disparate treatment, the plaintiff must 
make a showing that the lender based its decision to extend credit 
based on “a discriminatory intent or motive.”84 To allege disparate 
impact, the plaintiff must show that the lender’s practice resulted  
in a “disproportionately negative impact on a prohibited basis” 
regardless of whether the lender lacked the intent to discriminate.85 
Plaintiffs alleging disparate impact in the ECOA context may face 
heightened causation requirements if firms argue that their 
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methodologies simply mirror “existing forms of systemic bias.”86 Even 
if a plaintiff is able to establish causation, the defendant can establish 
that the challenged practice or policy is in place for a valid business 
purpose.87 The purpose need not be essential or completely necessary 
to business objectives; it must simply be relevant to the entity’s 
business objectives.88 
If a defendant can justify a challenged policy or practice with 
a legitimate business objective, the plaintiff must still provide an 
alternative method that mitigates the disparate impact but is still 
equally effective in fulfilling the defendant’s business objectives.89 
Given that credit-scoring algorithms—regardless of whether they use 
traditional or alternative data—are trade secrets, it is an enormous 
challenge for a plaintiff to overcome information asymmetries and 
gain an understanding of the tools used by these firms.90 
C. Gaps in the Existing Regulatory Framework 
The existing regulatory framework, comprised primarily of the 
FCRA and ECOA, is inadequate to address the challenges posed by 
the use of alternative Big Data and complex proprietary algorithms 
in credit scoring. Hurley, Adebayo, and Lee’s proposed model 
legislation, the Model Fairness and Transparency in Credit Scoring 
Act (FaTCSA) is designed to address the four major challenges the 
authors identified in the use of alternative credit-scoring tools and 
the insufficient regulatory framework surrounding them.91 This 
model legislation addresses transparency and accuracy issues arising 
from the shift towards alternative Big Data, as well as the possibility 
of discriminatory and biased scoring practices and the opportunities 
for firms employing these scoring practices to identify and  
exploit consumers from disadvantaged backgrounds.92 The following 
Subsections discuss the gaps in the regulatory framework  
and present potential enhancements to the recommendations 
incorporated in FaTCSA. 
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1. Transparency and Accuracy Issues 
The purpose of transparency in credit scoring is to ensure that 
scoring entities are held to standards reflecting their importance to 
society, as well as to ensure that consumers who are unable to access 
credit are able to understand the steps they must take to do so.93 It is 
unlikely that consumers will be able to take steps to improve their 
behaviors or identify mistakes in their credit reports if they are 
unaware of the factors that impact their credit scores, especially given 
the use of nontraditional data derived from Big Data that may not 
have been adequately tested for accuracy.94 
The biggest transparency-related issue with firms using 
alternative credit scoring methodologies is the secrecy of the 
methodologies used for developing the credit scores.95 Because the 
methodologies are protected trade secrets, it is difficult to know 
whether they conform to industry best practices or have been 
evaluated and developed through consultation with experts.96 The 
disclosure requirements in FaTCSA require firms to share their 
methodologies with a state attorney general or a body acting under 
the supervision of the state attorney general, but only upon request.97 
Given how important these scoring methodologies are to 
disadvantaged populations, the existing regulatory scheme can be 
enhanced by making periodic alternative data-related methodology 
disclosures mandatory, at least to federal regulators. Some experts 
argue that to adequately test scoring systems, regulators would 
require the input data used by scoring algorithms, along with source 
code programmer notes, and other correlations integrated into  
these algorithms.98 Additionally, commercial credit-rating agencies,  
such as Moody’s, publish detailed summaries of their assessment 
methodologies.99 Notably, commercial credit-rating agencies use data 
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that has been audited, and therefore regulated, for accuracy.100 While 
there may be more competition in the consumer credit-scoring market 
due to the proliferation of fintech firms that employ consumer-scoring 
methodologies, it does not make sense for firms to equate sharing 
information with regulators with disclosing trade secrets to potential 
competitors. 
The FCRA does not adequately address the transparency 
issues arising from the use of alternative data in consumer credit 
scoring because it does not place any limitations on the types or 
categories of data that can be used to evaluate consumer credit. 
Additionally, it is not feasible for consumers to assume that every 
data point collected about them may in some way impact their credit 
scores.101 For example, the FCRA does not distinguish between the 
inclusion of positive consumer data on timely payments or negative 
consumer data reflecting late payments.102   
While it is true that the inclusion of both positive and negative 
data may increase the overall accuracy of credit scoring, the collection 
of alternative data related to utility payments can further 
disadvantage financially vulnerable consumers, especially those who 
live in locations with harsher weather.103 For example, an individual 
may need to choose between making or deferring a utility payment 
for heat so that she can obtain help under federal assistance programs 
that require her to defer payments before she becomes eligible for the 
program benefits. In such scenarios, consumers may be forced to 
choose between obtaining needed assistance for nondiscretionary 
products or damaging their credit scores.104 
Even if Congress had passed the Credit Access and Inclusion 
Act of 2019, which would have amended the existing FCRA to permit 
the reporting of positive data on lease agreements, as well as utility 
and telecommunications services, there would still be gaps stemming 
from negative data that could harm the credit scores of financially 
disadvantaged consumers.105 The amendment would have prohibited 
the reporting of negative data when the consumer has commenced  
a payment plan to remedy late payments but does not outline 
requirements for the timing of the reporting.106 It also fails to place 
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an obligation on the firms to discuss or offer payment plans prior to 
reporting negative data to CRAs.107 Data can be reported and 
transferred much faster than payment plans can be established, and 
if the data reporting precedes the consumer’s opportunity to protect 
her credit score, the limitations on negative data in the statute are 
not very effective.   
2. Discrimination, Biased Scoring Practices, and Potential 
Exploitation Issues 
The existing ECOA does not adequately protect consumers, 
especially those from disadvantaged groups, against accidental biases 
built into alternative Big Data credit-scoring systems.108 Additionally, 
it does not prevent firms from using this biased data to target  
specific consumer groups with financial products with exceptionally 
unfavorable terms that they would not offer other consumers.109 Many 
ECOA-related issues stem from algorithms using nontraditional  
data that may evaluate consumers based on societal associations or 
protected characteristics rather than individual creditworthiness.110 
The use of data highly correlated with a prohibited 
characteristic can introduce similar biases into alternative consumer 
credit-scoring methodologies that the ECOA was designed to 
prevent.111 Because of the enormous volume of Big Data analyzed  
by consumer credit-scoring algorithms, they may “indirectly  
consider sensitive characteristics, such as race, even when those 
characteristics are not directly designated as input values.”112 These 
algorithms are designed to identify patterns and correlations between 
hundreds of variables. It is easy to imagine that these algorithms 
identify correlations between different behavioral traits that vary by 
culture, social status, and characteristics that are protected under the 
ECOA.113 Given that these systems are so complex and analyze such 
a high volume of data that they are able to find relationships between 
unrelated and random variables, it is even more apparent certain 
variables, especially nontraditional behavioral variables that appear 
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nondiscriminatory and neutral, are highly correlated with protected 
characteristics.114 
In addition to indirectly using prohibited characteristics in 
assessing consumer credit risk, these algorithms may also be 
developed and trained using data that does not have adequate 
coverage across all groups of people, one of the most important 
characteristics of a good data source.115 Consumers from different 
racial and cultural backgrounds may access the internet in ways that 
leave different types of digital footprints (e.g., using a mobile phone 
versus a computer), and people from some cultures are more likely to 
visit certain social media platforms than others.116 For these reasons, 
using nontraditional behavioral data that is highly correlated with 
certain protected characteristics in a consumer credit-scoring 
algorithm can introduce bias against a protected group.117 The 
implication of introducing this type of bias is that a consumer who 
has a certain unchangeable characteristic (e.g., race or national 
origin) may receive a rejection or less favorable lending terms than 
she would have gotten had she not had those characteristics.118 In 
other words, while alternative data can be very beneficial for the 
expansion of credit, other forms of alternative data may introduce 
prohibited biases into consumer credit scores.119 
Additionally, the ECOA does not expressly protect consumers 
from discrimination based on sexual orientation.120 The model 
FaTCSA includes sexual orientation as one of its protected 
characteristics.121 It is probably fairer to consumers from all sexual 
orientations, especially those that are considered “nontraditional,” to 
clearly prohibit discrimination on this basis rather than infer 
protections from a different characteristic, such as sex.122 
III. CLOSING THE GAPS IN THE EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
A disclosure regime such as the one outlined in FaTCSA that 
requires routine disclosures and attestation that the methodologies 
used are not discriminatory is a good first step in reducing the risk of 
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ECOA violations.123 However, additional steps can be taken to better 
ensure that credit scorers using alternative scoring systems are doing 
so in a nondiscriminatory way. 
Mandating disclosures from firms involved in consumer credit 
scoring is a potentially effective way to increase transparency.124 
While the model FaTCSA’s disclosure requirements are robust and 
shift the onus of verifying accuracy from the consumer to the  
credit-scoring firms, they should more stringently trace how input 
data is transformed into data consumed by scoring algorithms, also 
known as “data lineage.”125 The model FaTCSA requires routine and 
public disclosures regarding the types and classifications of data, the 
sources and transformations of this data, the methods used to collect 
it, and the particular data points or set of data points that the scoring 
models treat as significant. It also outlines credit-scoring standards, 
including requirements that “data must be regularly tested for 
accuracy, verifiability, and traceability.”126 However, the model 
FaTCSA does not have explicit disclosure requirements related to  
the traceability of the data.127 Consumers may find it difficult to 
understand where a listed data category or source was truly derived 
from because many types of alternative data are transformed several 
times before they are ultimately used by algorithms.128 
The FCRA or supplemental legislation should also include 
enhanced standards for adverse action notices for all CRAs and firms 
that use alternative credit-scoring systems. Because it is permissible 
for credit scorers to provide vague explanations in adverse action 
notices, consumers have very limited insight into why an adverse 
decision was made.129 A potential enhanced reporting notice should 
not only include granular data points denoting specific types of 
accounts and behaviors that influenced the decision to deny credit or 
a favorable rate to a consumer, but it should also provide the 
consumer with steps she can take to improve her score, as these may 
not be immediately clear given the breadth of alternative data and 
techniques used to collect it. Most importantly, an enhanced reporting 
notice should inform consumers how the factors were weighed 
relative to one another so the consumer is aware of which steps to 
prioritize. 
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Additionally, lenders using alternative data-scoring systems 
should disclose how they define “creditworthiness” so that consumers 
can gain a better understanding of the standards they are being held 
to. These disclosures will also hold lenders to an appropriate standard 
for credit scoring.130 The model FaTCSA, like the regulations 
promulgated to enforce the ECOA, requires that credit-scoring 
systems are in place with the purpose of predicting a consumer’s 
creditworthiness.131 However, neither the FCRA nor the ECOA 
explicitly requires that consumer credit scorers disclose what  
their definitions are.132 The lack of such a requirement is significant 
because “a poorly-crafted definition could also lead to inadvertent 
discrimination” if the definition is not tailored in a way that  
prevents bias against protected characteristics.133 Implementing a 
regulatory requirement that consumer credit scorers must define 
creditworthiness could also be a good starting point to develop or 
enhance model risk-management practices for consumer credit-risk 
methodologies.   
The use of a consumer’s internet-browsing data, including data 
based on her social media network, should either be curtailed or 
prohibited in consumer credit scoring because it introduces the risk 
that a consumer will be evaluated based on negative attributes that 
she, specifically, does not possess.134 In November 2019, the state of 
New York adopted Assembly Bill A5294, which prohibits a CRA or 
lender from using data derived from an individual consumer’s social 
media network in its credit-scoring methodology.135 The amendment 
was proposed to target a potential move toward integrating 
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nontraditional data in FICO scores and to protect individuals from 
bias based indirectly on geography, as many people develop social 
networks based on their geographic regions.136 The amendment to 
New York’s general business and banking laws defines “members of 
a consumer’s social network” as “a group of individuals authorized by 
a consumer to be part of his or her social media communications and 
network.”137 The amendment specifically states: “No consumer 
reporting agency shall . . . evaluate . . . the credit worthiness . . . of 
members of the consumer’s social network for purposes of 
determining the credit worthiness of the consumer.”138 
Similar legislation should be enacted at the federal level 
rather than leaving it up to individual states to decide whether  
they want to protect more vulnerable consumers. From the 
perspective of distributive justice, it is unfair for vulnerable 
consumers in some states to receive better protections against 
discrimination in credit scoring while consumers in other states do 
not. Consumers from financially disadvantaged backgrounds may not 
have the resources to move from a state with poor consumer 
protection laws to consumer-friendly states, such as California or 
New York. Further, many historically underprivileged communities 
experience regionalized inequality.139 These communities may live in 
areas where many policies are unfavorable to them (e.g., social 
services, criminal justice, and education), not just consumer 
protection laws.140 Legislation that enables all consumers in these 
communities to access credit as a vehicle to increase their financial 
wealth may be helpful in alleviating these regional inequalities as 
well.141 
If passing legislation limiting the use of nontraditional,  
social media-derived data is not feasible at a federal level, then  
the agencies regulating firms using alternative credit-scoring 
systems should operate under the presumption that alternative data  
is discriminatory. The US Department of Financial Services 
recommends that insurers located in New York conduct their due 
diligence and ensure that alternative data does not introduce bias 
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based on any protected characteristics, even if the data is purchased 
from a third party.142 Most importantly, the guidance indicates that 
insurers should be extremely cautious in employing alternative data 
and states that alternative data should not be used in an “algorithm 
or predictive model in underwriting or rating unless the insurer can 
establish that the underwriting or rating guidelines are not  
unfairly discriminatory.”143 Therefore, this guidance may encourage 
lenders to employ more rigorous practices in selecting the data used 
for consumer credit scoring, as well as ensure that the data does  
not introduce biased correlations into the scoring system. If 
regulators conduct audits under the rebuttable presumption that 
alternative data is discriminatory, the burden of proving fairness 
would shift to the lenders, an idea similar to the FaTCSA model 
legislation.144 
If legislative and regulatory changes are slow, then regulatory 
agencies should encourage firms to seek no-action letters with terms 
that benefit both the lender and the regulatory agencies such that  
the regulatory agency can gain insight into the methodologies and  
credit-risk management practices of the lenders.145 In 2017, the  
CFPB issued a no-action letter to Upstart Network, a firm that  
uses alternative data in addition to traditional data for the purposes 
of consumer credit underwriting and pricing.146 The CFPB’s issuance 
of the no-action letter was conditioned on Upstart Network 
maintaining “a model risk management and compliance plan that 
requires it to analyze and appropriately address risks to consumers, 
as well as assess the real-world impact of alternative data and 
machine learning.”147 These impacts are shared with the CFPB,  
along with data comparing outputs of alternative and traditional 
models, information that could be very valuable to the CFPB’s  
efforts to appropriately regulate CSAs and users of consumer 
reports.148 
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The results provided as part of the no-action letter plan were 
promising for both consumers and lenders.149 They indicate that 
improving transparency, by requiring disclosures and employing 
adequate risk-management practices, to prevent discriminatory 
lending practices can improve financial inclusion in consumer credit 
scoring using alternative data.150 The Upstart data was promising, 
with extension of credit increasing by upwards of 20 percent and 
average APRs decreasing by 15–17 percent across all “tested race, 
ethnicity, and sex segments.”151 It is notable that the use of 
alternative data did not completely supplant traditional data in the 
consumer credit-scoring methodology, and the primary forms of 
alternative data used were educational attainment or employment 
history.152 There was no use of behavioral data from consumer 
browsing history or social media networks incorporated into these 
models, as well as no utilities-related data.153 
IV. FUTURE OUTLOOK 
As the use of alternative data continues to gain momentum 
across various parts of the financial sector, regulatory bodies will 
need to define the roles they will play. Because regulatory agencies 
are still seeking to understand the impacts and methodologies 
surrounding alternative credit systems, fintech firms and their 
product offerings may be regulated on either a consolidated or 
fragmented basis.154 These regulatory decisions will have enormous 
implications not just for financial inclusion on the consumer side but 
also for profitability and risk management of lenders who seek to 
extend consumer credit. 
To ensure consumer credit is more accessible, regulators 
should adopt a disclosure regime and consumer-friendly regulatory 
framework that provide consumers with a more financially inclusive 
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credit system.155 Such a system would not only ensure more  
access to consumers in the United States but also to those in 
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